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ACTION AF-01

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| INFO | LOG-00 | AID-01 | CIAE-00 | C-01 | OASY-00 | DODE-00 | DS-00 |
| | EUR-01 | FDRE-01 | HA-09 | H-01 | TEDE-00 | INR-00 | IO-19 |
| | L-03 | ADS-00 | NSAE-00 | NSCE-00 | OIC-02 | OMB-01 | PA-01 |
| | PM-02 | PRS-01 | P-01 | SCT-03 | SNP-00 | SP-00 | SR-00 |
| | SS-00 | TRSE-00 | T-00 | USIE-00 | RPE-01 | | /049W |
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O 311342Z MAR 93

FM AMEMBASSY KIGALI

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3489

INFO AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY KAMPALA PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM PRIORITY

USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE //ECJ5-P/ETCC// PRIORITY

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CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 01 OF 03 KIGALI 01375

DEPT FOR AF/C, DS/I/CT, AND RP
DEPT PASS AID/AFR/EA AND OFDA/AFR

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PINS, PGOV, PREL, MOPS, RW

SUBJECT: GOR INTELLIGENCE ON POSSIBLE RPF ATTACK

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REF: KIGALI 1364

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT

2. SUMMARY. RWANDAN MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SUPPORTS
THE THEORY THAT THE RPF IS PREPARING FOR A MASSIVE,
DECISIVE ATTACK, WITH THE GOAL OF TAKING KIGALI. THE

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES L. DARIS
DATE/CASE ID: 1 APR 2003 200203990

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CHIEF OF MILITARY INTEL. THINKS THAT THE TIMING OF THE ATTACK COULD BE AS SOON AS APRIL 4 OR APRIL 8/9; THAT STALLING IN ARUSHA IS PART OF THE RPF GRAND STRATEGY; AND THAT THE RPF GIVES NO THOUGHT TO THE MASSIVE HUMAN COST WHICH COULD RESULT FROM THE TAKING OF KIGALI. [REDACTED] SOURCE GIVES CREDENCE TO THE INTELLIGENCE REPORTS. THE GOR MILITARY INTEL. CHIEF SEEMS RESIGNED TO A MAJOR DEFEAT IN THE DAYS TO COME. END SUMMARY.

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3. AS A FOLLOW-UP TO AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH DEFBNSE MINISTER JAMES GASANA ON MAR. 30, ECONOFF MET WITH GENERAL STAFF J-2 CHIEF OF INTELLIGENCE LTC. ANATOLE NSENGIYUMVA ON MAR. 31. NSENGIYUMVA OFFERED THE FOLLOWING DETAILS FROM MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DATA AND ANALYSIS RE: A POSSIBLE IMMINENT RPF ATTACK.

THE STRATEGY

4. THE J-2 CLAIMED THAT THE RPF IS IMPLEMENTING THE FOLLOWING MILITARY STRATEGY:

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-- STEP 1: EXECUTED FEB 8 TO 22. ATTACK ALONG THE FRONT IN ORDER TO PUSH GOR FORCES AWAY FROM THE FEB 7 FRONT LINE, MORE OR LESS SURROUND BYUMBA AND RUHENERI TOWNS, AND POSITION FORCES FOR EXECUTION OF STEP 2.

-- KEY GOAL: POSITION FORCES TO THE NORTH AND EAST OF RUHENERI.

-- OPERATIONAL PROBLEMS: GOR FORCES IN CENTER OF COUNTRY FELL BACK TOO FAST, ALLOWING RPF TO ADVANCE AS FAR SOUTH AS TUMBA, 27 KMS FROM KIGALI. BATTLE LINES BECAME TOO LONG, REQUIRING VIRTUALLY ALL RPF FORCES TO MASS ALONG THE FRONT, STRETCHING SUPPLY LINES, AND LEAVING NO SIGNIFICANT FORCES IN THE REAR.

-- SOLUTION: ACCEPT DAR ES SALAAM REQUIREMENT TO PULL BACK FROM MAR. 17 POSITIONS. SINCE TOTAL PULLBACK IMPOSSIBLE TO VERIFY, RPF WITHDRAWS FROM FORWARD POSITIONS TO REAR AREAS FOR EASIER RESUPPLY,

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MAINTAINS STRONG PRESENCE NORTH AND WEST OF RUHENERI (IN VOLCANO FOOTHILLS), AND ON THREE SIDES OF BYUMBA.

-- STEP 2: TO BE EXECUTED IN THE VERY NEAR FUTURE. MASS ATTACK SOUTHWARD FROM POSITIONS NORTH AND WEST OF RUHENERI. CUT THE RUHENERI - GISENYI ROAD AT MUKAMIRA, TAE PRESIDENT'S HOME COMMUNE OF KARAGO. SURROUND, CAPTURE OR KILL, AND THUS NEUTRALIZE BETWEEN 7 AND 10 BATALLIONS OF GOR'S BEST FORCES. ATTAIN MAJOR PSYCHOLOGICAL VICTORY BY TAKING PRESIDENT'S HOME AREA; GISENYI AND RUHENERI FALL BY THEMSELVES.

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-- NEXT, CLOSE THE LOOP ON BYUMBA, TRAPPING GOR FORCES IN TOWN, GAINING CONTROL OF GATUNA - KIGALI ROAD TO SOUTH OF BYUMBA TOWN.

-- ATTACK EASTWARD THROUGH NGARAMA TOWARD GABIRO, TAKING RWAMAGANA - KAGITUMBA ROAD.

-- LASTLY, AFTER RAPID RESUPPLY VIA PAVED ROADS FROM CYAMIKA, GATUNA, AND KAGITUMBA, AND NEUTRALIZATION OF SOME 15 BATALLIONS OF GOR FORCES, STRIKE SOUTHWARD

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FROM RUHENERI, BYUMBA AND GABIRO TO TAKE KIGALI.

THE INTELLIGENCE

5. J-2 BACKED UP MINISTER GASANA'S POINTS (REFTEL) BY STATING THAT REPORTS AS RECENT AS MAR. 30 SHOWED THE MOVEMENT OF HEAVY ARTILLERY INTO RUHENERI PREFECTURE AT KIDAO. THIS INCLUDES 122 MM ARTILLERY TOWED BEHIND TRUCKS. A GROUP OF APPROXIMATELY 80 UNIFORMED RPF WERE ALLEGEDLY SEEN MOVING FROM KIDAO TOWARD KINIGI (APPROX. TWO PLATOONS, OR A SHORT COMPANY). THE RPF IS REPORTED TO BE MOVING MORE

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TROOPS AND WEAPONS THROUGH UGANDA TO KISORO ON THE
UGANDAN SIDE OF THE VOLCANOES. LASTLY, THE RPF IS
EMGAGING IN MASSIVE RESUPPLY VIA BOTH CYANIKA AND
GATUNA.

THE PRETEXT

6. THE PRETEXT ASSUMED FOR THE ATTACK COULD BE A
BREAKDOWN IN THE ARUSHA TALKS, WITH THE RPF BLAMING
THE GOR FOR LACK OF FLEXIBILITY ON THE SUBJECT OF
PROPORTIONS WITHIN THE ARMED FORCES.

TIMING

7. THE ATTACK MUST TAKE PLACE BEFORE THE ARUSHA
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TALKS GET CLOSE TO THE SIGNING OF A COMPREHENSIVE
PEACE AGREEMENT (THUS RECENT RPF STALLING), AND
BEFORE ANY INTERNATIONAL FORCE IS IN PLACE, EITHER ON
THE UGANDA - RWANDA BORDER OR IN THE BUFFER ZONE.
J-2 CLAIMED THAT THE RPF HAS HAD A TENDENCY TO ATTACK
AT THE END OF THE WEEK, ON THE FULL MOON. SUNDAY,
APRIL 4, OR THURSDAY/FRIDAY, APRIL 8-9, WOULD BE
PROPITIOUS.

THE PHILOSOPHICAL CONUNDRUM

G. WHEN ASKED HOW THE RPF COULD CONSIDER THE TAKING
OF KIGALI, WHEN ALL OBSERVERS AND MOST RWANDANS
ASSUME THAT SUCH AN EVENT WOULD LEAD TO MASSACRES ON
A MASSIVE SCALE OF TUTSIS COUNTRY-WIDE, THE J-2
STATED THAT SUCH LOSS OF LIFE DOES NOT CONCERN THE
RPF. IN THE RPF'S VIEW, HE SAID, TUTSIS WHO DID NOT
FLEE THE COUNTRY WITHIN THE LAST 30 YEARS ARE
COMPLICITOUS WITH THE HUTU REGIMES, HAVING ENRICHED
THEMSELVES AND PARTICIPATED IN THE DIVISION OF SPOILS
LEFT BEHIND BY THE REFUGEES. HUTUS ALIGNED WITH THE
MDR WILL HAVE TO BE ELIMINATED; GIVEN THE PARTY'S
ROOTS WITHIN THE PARMEHUTU PARTY. THOSE ALIGNED WITH
THE MRND WILL ALSO HAVE TO BE ELIMINATED. WHEN THE

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KILLING IS DONE, THERE WILL STILL BE PEOPLE LEFT; THE RPF'S ONLY CONCERN IS THE RETURN OF THE REFUGEE COMMUNITY TO ITS BIRTH RIGHT.

IS THE INTELLIGENCE WORTH ANYTHING?

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9. IN FOLLOW-ON DISCUSSIONS, [REDACTED] STATED THAT HE CONSIDERED GOR MILITARY INTELLIGENCE TO BE ABOUT B5 PER CENT RELIABLE. WITHOUT THE QUESTION BEING ASKED, HE BROUGHT UP THE DATES OF APRIL 4 AND APRIL 8/9 FOR A POSSIBLE ATTACK.

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COMMENT

10. THE FRENCH EVALUATION OF GOR INTEL. CREDIBILITY AT 85 PERCENT IS AT LEAST A BIT BIASED--SOME OF THIS INFORMATION COMES FROM FRENCH SOURCES. THE POSSIBILITY THAT THIS INTEL. READOUT IS BASED ON RPF DISINFORMATION CANNOT BE RULED OUT. SUCH REPORTS PUT EXTRAORDINARY PRESSURE ON THE GOR TO TRY TO PUSH THE NEGOTIATIONS FORWARD. WHEN ASKED IF THE RPF IS CAPABLE OF EXECUTING THE STRATEGY OUTLINED ABOVE, THE J-2 GAVE AN UNQUALIFIED YES. HE GAVE THE IMPRESSION OF BEING EXTREMELY CONCERNED, TO THE POINT OF BEING ALMOST RESIGNED TO THE POSSIBILITY OF A SERIOUS MILITARY DEFEAT IN THE DAYS TO COME. END COMMENT.
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